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1 Introduction
Admittedly the recent Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) revolution
has favored the development of numerous innovative workplace practices in most OECD
countries (see for example Osterman, 2004, for the US case, and Boucekkine and Crifo,
2007, for more recent empirical evidence for OECD countries). A view emerges as the
productivity gains from investing in ICT cannot be significant without an appropriate
evolution in the workplace organization towards more flexibility, which in turn is likely to
rise the demand for skilled labor. This view is advocated and tested for example in the
well-known paper of Bresnahan et al. (2002).
Table 1 illustrates this rising organizational flexibility following the ICT revolution.
Work organization inside firms evolved from specialization to multi-tasking, and flexible
forms of workplace organization have largely diffused in most OECD economies. For
example, the two thirds of American firms and 57% of German establishments now rely on
multi-tasking, and the proportion of workers involved in organizational changes increased
continuously (and even doubled) in Great Britain and France.
Table 1: Tasks and computer use in the EU (% of workers), 1991-2000
1991 1996 2000
Job involving complex tasks 57 56
Job involving repetitive tasks 23.3 16 15
Working with computers 13.9 38 41
Source: European surveys on working conditions, European foundation for the
improvement of living and working conditions.
Parallel to this trend, we can also observe an increasing employment share of skilled
workers in major OECD countries during the 1990s along with the dissemination of ICT,
as shown in Table 2 (additional evidence confirming this trend in other OECD countries
can be found in Boucekkine and Crifo, 2007).
Table 2: High-skilled (HS) ICT workers in the European Union and the United States,
Average annual employment growth (1995-01) (* = in 2001)
HS workers HS ICT-related Share of HS ICT workers
workers in total occupations*
United States 2.79 5.29 2.63
France 1.67 7.11 2.05
Italy 5.99 8.58 1.30
Belgium 2.13 8.91 2.01
Germany 1.66 9.41 1.90
Denmark 3.08 9.49 2.58
EU 2.79 10.11 2.01
United Kingdom 1.37 12.63 2.60
Source: OECD (July 2004) based on the Eurostat Labour Force Survey and the US
Current Population Survey, May 2003.
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A definitely much less stressed aspect of organizational change, which is central
in this paper, is the impact on human resources departments. However, one would
expect that the role of such department will be significantly altered in a situation
where flexible forms of work organization are so massively adopted. Indeed, a quick
look at the data confirms this intuition. In particular, the management ratio in-
creased in many OECD countries since the early 1980s. In France for instance, the
percentage of workers employed in managerial and professional specialty occupations
rose from 4% in 1980 to 6% in 1990 and 14% in 2000. Similarly, this ratio ranges
from 12% in 1980 to 15% in 1990 and 22% in 2000 in Great Britain and from 22%
in 1980 to 26% in 1990 and 30% in 2000 in the United States. Additional evidence
for other OECD countries are reproduced in Table 3.
Table 3: Employment in administrative, legislative and managerial occupations (in
percentage of total employment) in Canada, Denmark, Norway, UK and US, 1981-2000
1981 1985 1991 1995 1997 2000
Canada 8.1 11.5 13.4 10.9 10.8 9.7
Denmark 4.06 3.4 4.4 6.5 7.019 7.12
Norway 5.3 6.5 6.6 7.02 7.8 8.02
UK 14.1 16.05 15.9 16.1
US 11.5 11.4 12.6 13.7 14.2 14.6
Source: International Labour Organization, Labour Statistics Database. The employment
levels in administrative, legislative and managerial occupations corresponds to the
employment levels of legislative officials and government administrators and managers.
In sum, the evolution of skills, job content and work organization observed in
many OECD countries over the past decades can be summarized in the following
three main characteristics:
• increase in the proportion of workers employed in managerial occupations
• diffusion of innovative workplace practices based on multi-tasking and com-
puter use
• increase in skills requirements
The fact that the development of multi-tasking seems to be accompanied by
an increase in the management ratios could suggest that coordinating workers and
tasks should become more complex in the new economy. Becker and Murphy (1992)
already argued that unlike Adam Smith’s argument, specialization and the optimal
division of labor would be determined more by the cost of combining specialized
workers - i.e. coordination costs - than by the extent of the market. In particular, two
types of coordination costs matter: the costs incurred by firms when coordinating
workers’ effort across various tasks and the costs of versatility incurred by workers
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subject to increased pressure and work rhythms. This contribution is only concerned
with the former type of costs.
This paper studies the determination of the optimal number of tasks performed
per worker in an economy where individuals devote time to production and human
capital accumulation, and where multi-tasking both increases production and gives
rise to coordination costs. Coordination costs could take several forms, which are
surveyed in detail in the next section. In particular, we shall distinguish between
horizontal coordination costs, which involve the costs of coordinating the tasks ac-
complished by each production worker, and vertical coordination costs, which reflect
coordinating different workers. In our model, the first can reduce the coordination
costs by assigning more workers to pure coordination non-productive tasks. We
then examine how the economy reacts to permanent exogenous technological accel-
erations. The model is able to reproduce the three stylized facts outlined above.
Importantly enough, the model delivers a permanent trend towards multi-tasking
and human capital accumulation following permanent technological accelerations,
while the size of the human resource department, that is the fraction of workers
devoted to reduce coordination costs, is also significantly raised.
The paper produces two important contributions to the literature. In first place,
it brings out a novel modelling of coordination costs and the associated human
resources management workers. The framework is additionally found to replicate
the recent evidence on the evolution of the size of human resources departments
in the OECD countries following the ICT revolution. Second, it generalizes the
findings of Boucekkine and Crifo (2007) in many respects. These authors have
produced a simple OLG model with a fixed given number of tasks with human
capital accumulation but without coordination costs. In this paper, the number of
tasks is endogenous in the presence of well-motivated coordination costs. In this
sense, it has a much broader scope than Boucekkine and Crifo’s 2007 model.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines precisely coordination costs.
Section 3 presents the setup of the general equilibrium model and derives the opti-
mality and equilibrium conditions. Section 4 derives the steady-state values and the
associated comparative statics. Section 5 reports some simulations exercises to ana-
lyze the impact of permanent exogenous technological accelerations on the economy.
Section 6 concludes, while the main computations are reported in the Appendix.
2 Defining and accounting for coordination costs
As we analyze within-firm work organization, the evidence we report here is focused
on “internal” coordination costs, i.e. intra (or within) firm coordination costs1.
1External coordination costs correspond for instance to the costs of finding suppliers, negotiating
contracts and paying bills to them and such issues are outside the scope of our model (external
coordination costs are examined for instance in the transaction costs literature or in the industrial
organization literature).
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An important and complex problem is to estimate empirically the costs resulting
from work organization and occupational conditions and changes. Injuries are the
extreme outcome of poor working conditions, excessive and unmanageable pressures
but they imply direct and obvious costs for workers and firms like absenteeism, sick
pay, turnover costs, compensation and litigation costs, damage to equipment and
production or reduced performance. However, the costs of coordinating activities
and tasks between workers are not limited to safety and health conditions in the
workplace. Precise empirical evidence on the extent of coordination costs is hard
to find in the economics literature (unlike psychology, sociology, management and
computer science where coordination costs are subject to a wider attention)2 but
we can give a simplified typology of available empirical measures by distinguishing
three types of coordination costs.
The first category of coordination costs are switch costs, that denote the fact that
people can flexibly switch back and forth between tasks but they cannot do it without
costs. Switch costs hence measure the individual costs - mental or physical - of
switching from one task to another, they correspond to “inter-tasks learning costs”.
Empirically, they are essentially measured by psychologists in terms of response time
and acuracy3. Interestingly, switch costs occur even when people know in advance
the identity of the new task and have ample time to prepare for the switch. Hence, if
multi-tasking involves complicated and multi-faceted sub-activities, switching costs
will be far from negligible.
The second category of individual costs of task switching is easier to account for
in an economic perspective because it is measured by the direct financial losses of
tasks coordination. These losses are evaluated in terms of human resources man-
agement. The number of workers employed in human resources services has grown
in major OECD countries between 1980 and 2005 and more significantly, US man-
agers reported a waste of 34 days per year and senior executives 7 weeks a year - an
hour per day - in managing employees underperformance. Overall “poor hiring and
people management practices” would have induced a shortfall worth 1% of US GDP
in 2004 (SHL, 2004). But these financial losses also include the loss of wages or
income and the additional expenditures (health care and medical treatment) associ-
ated with failures of tasks coordination. In the US, health care costs and individuals’
health insurance have been rising by approximately 50% over the past two decades
2A notable exception comes from the literature on transaction costs economics. For Wallis
and North (1986) transactions costs can be decomposed into motivation costs (agency costs and
conflict of interests among managers, owners and debt holders as well as costs of cheating and
opportunistic behaviours) and coordination costs (costs of obtaining information, coordinating
input in production and measurement costs). Both marketed and non-marketed transaction costs
(e.g. resources spent in waiting, getting permits to do business, cutting through red tapes etc.)
are concerned. In developed economies, the transaction sector would represent 60% of GNP and
non-marketed transactions costs 11.3% of GDP per capita (Wang, 2003).
3For Lien et al. (2006), when a typical response to a single stimulus takes 300 milliseconds,
adding a second task increases the response to about 800 milliseconds. Extending the difference
to a car driving 60 miles an hour, the response rate more than doubles.
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and part of this rise could be imputed to organizational changes (Cartwright and
Cooper, 1997).
The third category of tasks coordination costs are measured in terms of human
costs, and they embed the pain, fear and general reduction in the quality of life asso-
ciated with stress and poor working conditions. Such costs are difficult to evaluate
but they are often embedded into indexes of well-being. In the 2000 European work-
ing condition survey, work-related stress was the second most common work-related
health problem across European economies. Workers involved in innovative work
organizational practices also tend to be subject to greater psychological discomfort
and to face more mental strain than their non innovative counterparts (Askenazy et
al., 2002). Moreover, as far as employers are concerned, the effects of work related
stress and pressure on the organizations and the firms’ costs can be high when they
result in greater sickness absenteeism, impaired performance and productivity and
higher turnover rates. In the British industry for instance, according to a survey
conducted in 2000, almost 40% of all absenteeism could be attributed to stress at
the workplace at a cost of £4.2 billion a year (Hoel et al., 2001). Adding the replace-
ment costs and the loss of productivity in connection with stress, firms’ total cost
from stressful (changing and/or multi-tasking) work environments is important.
The literature on coordination problems mostly focuses on the division of labor
and the returns to workers’ specialization (Yang and Borland, 1991, Tamura, 1992).
Some papers examine the impact of ICT on coordination (Brynjolfsson et al., 1994),
but very few papers analyze the role of coordination costs per se (see e.g. Becker
and Murphy, 1992, or Hobijn, 1999). As coordination costs are multi-faceted, the
theoretical literature has focused on various types of costs borne by the firm and
the employees, among which:
• Switching costs between activities in terms of time, response delay or reduced
goods quality (Lien et al. 2003, 2006).
• Communication costs and knowledge acquisition costs between workers (see
Dessein and Santos, 2003, Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994, Radner, 1993, Gari-
cano, 2000, Borghans and Ter Weel, 2006). In Garicano’s model, for instance,
higher layers of problem solvers in the firm increases the utilization rate of
knowledge, thus economizing on knowledge acquisition, at the cost of increas-
ing the communication required.
• Administrative coordination costs (assigning tasks, allocating resources and
integrating outputs) and expertise coordination costs (managing knowledge
and skill dependencies for complex, nonroutine intellectual tasks) (see Faraj
and Sproull, 2000).
• Contracts incompleteness (see Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman, 2005). The
basic idea here is that a firm decides a range of tasks to be performed and the
division of labor among its workers. Coordination costs come from the fact that
only a fraction of the activities that workers have to realize are contractible, the
others are nonverifiable and noncontractible (and lead to under-investment).
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In our model, focusing on internal coordination costs requires to account for
both employee-level and firm-level coordination costs. In particular, it is important
to explicitely incorporate human resources management as an activity necessary
to coordinate the tasks performed by production workers. We therefore propose a
typology that distinguishes two categories of internal coordination costs: horizontal
and vertical coordination costs.
Horizontal coordination costs are the costs (at the firm level) of coordinating the
tasks realized by each production worker. They embed switch costs between tasks,
inter-tasks learning and information sharing costs, but also the strain associated with
versatility and stressful working conditions. Such costs mainly concern production
workers.
Vertical coordination costs are the costs of coordinating workers, that is the “costs
of managers and others who decide when, where and how to produce” (Brynjolfsson
et al., 1994). Coordinating workers is a costly activity which induces expenses
in addition to the direct wage costs of human resources managers and specialists.
Vertical coordination costs mainly concern workers employed in human resources
services.
3 The model
The model considers an economy in discrete time (from 0 to ∞) with an active
population of size L4. The firm occupational structure is composed of two types of
jobs: human resources jobs (in fraction ρ of the workforce employed) and production
jobs (in fraction 1−ρ of the workforce employed). Workers devote time to production
(either in the human resources service or in the production service) and to human
capital accumulation.
3.1 Technology and coordination costs
The economy is characterized by a representative firm that produces a homogeneous
(numeraire) good according to the following technology:
yt = At ·
∫ nt
0
[(1− ρt) · ht · xt(i) · Lt]
1−α
di 0 < α < 1 (1)
where At is a productivity parameter, Lt is the volume of hours worked with human
capital ht, xt(i) is the time devoted to task i, nt is the number of tasks performed
per worker and ρt is the fraction of the workforce in the personnel (human resources)
service.
4Note that when labor is divisible L measures either the number of workers for a fixed working
time, or the volume of hours worked when working time can vary (given a fixed upper bound).
Here we consider the second interpretation.
7
The worker’s productive time is equal to Tt, hence we also have the constraint:∫ nt
0
xt(i)di = Tt (2)
Tasks are symmetric, i.e. xt(i) = xt, and from (2) we then get:
xt =
Tt
nt
and substituting this expression in (1) we obtain the production function:
yt = At · [(1− ρt) · ht · Tt · Lt]
1−α
nαt (3)
Producing the good implies two types of costs: production costs and coordination
costs (a similar element can be found in Brynjolfsson et al., 1994). Since production
requires physical resources and knowledge about how to combine them, production
costs correspond to traditional costs of transforming inputs into output (physical
- productive - resources expenses) whereas coordination costs correspond to the
costs of combining and managing interactions and dependencies between resources
(tasks and/or workers). In our model, labor is the sole input, therefore production
costs equal the total wage bill and coordination costs depend on the number of tasks
realized per worker (n) and on the fraction of workers in the human resources service
(ρ).
The firm’s profits (given that output is the numeraire) then write:
πt = At · [(1− ρt) · ht · Tt · Lt]
1−α
nαt − C (n, ρ)− wt · ht · Tt · Lt
where wt is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor and C (n, ρ) represents coordi-
nation costs measured as pure output loss.
The coordination costs function depends on horizontal and vertical coordination
costs as follows:
C (n, ρ) =
h (n, ρ) · v (ρ)
d
where h (n, ρ) denotes horizontal coordination costs and v (ρ) denotes vertical coor-
dination costs, while d reflects the extent of coordination costs (a higher d reduces
the importance or magnitude of coordination costs).
Horizontal coordination costs are the firm-level costs of coordinating the tasks real-
ized by each production worker. They embed switch costs between tasks, inter-tasks
learning and information sharing costs, but also the strain associated with versatility
and stressful working conditions. The higher the number of tasks per worker, the
higher the switch costs, the higher the inter-tasks learning and information sharing
costs and the higher the stress costs. Since production workers are in fraction 1− ρ,
we assume that the costs of coordinating n tasks for each worker writes:
h (n, ρ) = nξ · (1− ρ)θ
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where ξ, θ > 0 (we do not impose ξ 	= θ).
In other words, the costs of horizontal tasks coordination are based upon the idea
that allocating workers’ attention over various activities is likely to raise the oc-
currence of mistakes on the job. This increasing risk of production failure reduces
the value of output and profits by an amount that depends both on the number of
tasks per capita n and on the size of the production service (1−ρ), given elasticities
parameters ξ and θ that will be discussed below.
Vertical coordination costs are the costs of coordinating workers. Consistently with
Section 2, they reflect the administrative cost of running a human resource depart-
ment in a firm. In our set-up, such a cost involves of course a direct labor cost,
which is already accounted for by the last term of the profit expression given above,
but also an extra-cost depending on the size of the human resources department to
be operated. To this end, we assume that vertical coordination costs is an increasing
function of the share of workers in the human resources service, that is:
v (ρ) = ρη
where η > 0.
The fact that vertical coordination costs are linked to the size of human resources
service and add to the wage bill can be related to the literature on vertical inte-
gration. Indeed, since Williamson’s theory of transaction costs, it is well known
that a major limit to the growth of firms lies in the costs of internal organization.
As explained by Joskow (2003), the volume of auditing information that must be
processed by management grows non-linearly with the size and scope of the firm and
becomes more difficult to use to control costs and quality effectively and to adapt
to changing market conditions. Moreover, monitoring becomes also more difficult
in large organizations and there are therefore potential shirking problems resulting
from low power internal compensation incentives. In sum, the decision whether or
not to vertically integrate comes from a tradeoff between the costs of market-based
arrangements and the costs of internal organization described by the relatively in-
ferior adaptive properties of bureaucratic hierarchies to rapidly changing outside
opportunities over the longer term and the difficulty of designing compensation
mechanisms to give managers and employees appropriate incentives to control costs
and product quality5. Here, we rely on this debate on the “make or buy” decision
by accounting for the fact that firms relying on large human resources departments
are characterized by specific management costs (bureaucratic and incentives costs)
labelled as vertical coordination costs.
We now make clear two working assumptions for the optimization problem of the
firm to make sense. We first need to ensure that function C (n, ρ) is increasing in n
5However, as highlighted by Joskow (2003), this literature has focused much more on the ineffi-
ciencies of market transactions than it has on the strengths and weaknesses of internal organization.
Our focus on vertical and horizontal coordination costs can therefore provide an interesting com-
plementary contribution to this debate.
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and decreasing in ρ. We need the latter condition on ρ to have an interior solution
to the optimization problem tackled. Indeed, an increase in ρ decreases production
labor, and therefore production. To balance this negative impact on profits, we need
the increase in ρ lowers the coordination costs. With analytical forms postulated,
we need the decrease in horizontal coordination costs due to an increment in ρ more
than compensates the induced rising vertical coordination costs. This property will
be put in more formal terms in Proposition 2.
The convexity of the cost function can be easily investigated. We have the
following result:
Proposition 1 The cost function C(nt, ρt) =
n
ξ
t ·(1−ρt)
θ·ρηt
dt
is convex when ξ > 1,
θ < 1 and η is small enough.
Proof. The first-order partial derivatives of the cost function are given by:
∂C
∂nt
=
ξn
ξ−1
t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
∂C
∂ρt
=
n
ξ
t
dt
(1− ρt)
θ−1
ρ
η−1
t [η − (η + θ) ρt]
while the second-order partial derivatives are:
∂2C
∂n2t
=
ξ (ξ − 1)nξ−2t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
∂2C
∂ρt∂nt
=
∂2C
∂nt∂ρt
=
ξn
ξ−1
t
dt
(1− ρt)
θ−1
ρ
η−1
t [η − (η + θ) ρt]
∂2C
∂ρ2t
=
n
ξ
t
dt
(1− ρt)
θ−2
ρ
η−2
t [η (η − 1) (1− ρt)− ρtη (θ − 1)+
−ρtη (η + θ) (1− ρt)− ρ
2
t (η + θ) (θ − 1)
]
and the hessian matrix is:
H =

∂2C
∂n2t
∂2C
∂ρt∂nt
∂2C
∂nt∂ρt
∂2C
∂ρ2t

and for the cost function to be convex this matrix must be positive definite, i.e. we
must have:
H1 > 0 H2 > 0
With reference to the first condition we have:
H1 > 0⇒
∂2C
∂n2t
> 0⇒
ξ (ξ − 1)nξ−2t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
> 0⇒ ξ > 1
i.e. it is satisfied if ξ > 1, while with reference to the second condition we have:
H2 > 0⇒ detH > 0⇒
∂2C
∂n2t
·
∂2C
∂ρ2t
−
(
∂2C
∂ρt∂nt
)2
> 0
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that is:
ξ (ξ − 1)nξ−2t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
·
n
ξ
t
dt
(1− ρt)
θ−2
ρ
η−2
t [η (η − 1) (1− ρt)− ρtη (θ − 1)+
−ρtη (η + θ) (1− ρt)− ρ
2
t (η + θ) (θ − 1)
]
−
[
ξn
ξ−1
t
dt
(1− ρt)
θ−1
ρ
η−1
t [η − (η + θ) ρt]
]2
> 0
that leads to:
ξn
2ξ−2
t (1− ρt)
2θ−2
ρ
2η−2
t
d2t
[(ξ − 1) η (η − 1) (1− ρt)− ρtη (ξ − 1) (θ − 1)+
−ρtη (ξ − 1) (η + θ) (1− ρt)− ρ
2
t (ξ − 1) (η + θ) (θ − 1) +
−ξη2 + 2ξηρt (η + θ) + ξ
(
η2 + 2ηθ + θ2
)
ρ2t
]
> 0
The fraction outside the square bracket is positive, while considering the expression
inside the square bracket and letting η tend to 0 we get:
−ρ2t (ξ − 1) θ (θ − 1) + ξθ
2ρ2t > 0,
which holds when ξ > 1 and θ < 1, and hence the cost function is convex under the
conditions of the proposition.
At this point the profit function writes:
πt = At ·
[
(1− ρt) · ht · T
d
t · Lt
]1−α
nαt −
n
ξ
t · (1− ρt)
θ · ρηt
dt
− wt · ht · T
d
t · Lt
where dt > 0 and where T
d
t denotes now the working time demanded by the firm.
In the decentralized economy the firm’s intertemporal optimization program is then
given by6:
max
{nt,Tdt ,ρt}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + r1) (1 + r2) ... (1 + rt)
[
At
[
(1− ρt)htT
d
t Lt
]1−α
nαt +
−
n
ξ
t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
− wthtT
d
t Lt
]
The first-order conditions of this program are:
∂f
∂nt
=
1
(1 + r1) (1 + r2) ... (1 + rt)
[
αAt
[
(1− ρt) htT
d
t Lt
]1−α
nα−1t −
ξn
ξ−1
t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
]
= 0
∂f
∂T dt
=
1
(1 + r1) (1 + r2) ... (1 + rt)
[
(1− α)At
[
(1− ρt) htT
d
t Lt
]−α
(1− ρt)htLtn
α
t − wthtLt
]
= 0
∂f
∂ρt
=
1
(1 + r1) (1 + r2) ... (1 + rt)
[
− (1− α)At
[
(1− ρt) htT
d
t Lt
]−α
htT
d
t Ltn
α
t +
−
n
ξ
t
dt
[
η (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η−1
t − θ (1− ρt)
θ−1
ρ
η
t
]]
= 0
6plus the standard transversality conditions.
11
from which we obtain:
αAt (1− ρt)
1−α (
htT
d
t Lt
)1−α
nαt =
ξn
ξ
t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
(4)
(1− α)At (1− ρt)
1−α (
htT
d
t Lt
)−α
nαt = wt (5)
(1− α)At (1− ρt)
−α (
htT
d
t Lt
)1−α
nαt =
n
ξ
t
dt
[
θ (1− ρt)
θ−1
ρ
η
t − η (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η−1
t
]
(6)
The second-order conditions of the problem of the firm, that guarantee the presence
of a maximum, are checked in Appendix 7.1.
Equation (4) gives the optimality condition for the number of tasks by equalizing
the marginal productivity of a task (that is, the increase in output due to an ad-
ditional task) with the marginal cost of a task (that is, the marginal increase in
horizontal coordination costs). Similarly, the optimal demand for productive time
T determined in equation (5) equalizes the marginal product of productive time
with its marginal remuneration.
Equation (6) is the most important condition of the firm’s block, as it provides the
optimality condition for the fraction of labor devoted to coordination tasks. The
left-hand side clearly reflects the loss in production induced by diverting workers
from production. The right-hand side reflects the marginal impact of a larger share
of human resources specialists on the costs of internal coordination. By definition,
this impact is twofold. On the one hand, more workers in the human resources
department implies less workers in production, and less productive workers means a
lower exposure by the firm to the risk of productive mistakes, thereby a lower level
of horizontal costs of tasks coordination. On the other hand however, more workers
in the human resources department drives the vertical component of coordination
costs in the opposite direction by construction. More human resources specialists
means indeed a higher bureaucratic and incentives burden, thereby driving vertical
coordination costs upward. For condition (6) to make sense, it is of course necessary
to ensure that the right-hand side is positive at least locally, which is done in Propo-
sition 2. Note that this needed property amounts to guarantee that the coordination
costs function C(n, ρ) is a decreasing function of ρ, a point made before.
3.2 Household and human capital accumulation
The household in the economy has a utility function given by:
u (ct) =
c1−τt − 1
1− τ
τ > 0
where ct is consumption, and to simplify the analysis we then assume τ = 1, that is:
u (ct) = ln ct (7)
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The household is then endowed with one unit of time supplied each period,
that is spent on working (the fraction T st ) or on human capital accumulation (the
fraction 1−T st ), and the accumulation of human capital is described by the following
equation:
ht+1 = Et · h
δ
t · (1− T
s
t )
1−δ 0 < δ < 1 (8)
where Et is an efficiency parameter.
The household’s intertemporal optimization program in the decentralized econ-
omy is then given by7:
max
{ct,T st ,at+1,ht+1}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt ln ct
s.t.
at+1 = (1 + rt) at + wthtT
s
t − ct
ht+1 = Eth
δ
t (1− T
s
t )
1−δ
where β is the discount factor (with 0 < β < 1) and at represents the assets held at
time t.
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L =
∞∑
t=0
{
βt ln ct + β
tµt [(1 + rt) at + wthtT
s
t − ct − at+1] +
+βtλt
[
Eth
δ
t (1− T
s
t )
1−δ − ht+1
]}
and the first-order conditions are given by:
∂L
∂ct
=
βt
ct
− βtµt = 0
∂L
∂T st
= βtµtwtht − β
tλt (1− δ)Eth
δ
t (1− T
s
t )
−δ = 0
∂L
∂at+1
= βt+1µt+1 (1 + rt+1)− β
tµt = 0
∂L
∂ht+1
= βt+1µt+1wt+1T
s
t+1 + β
t+1λt+1δEt+1h
δ−1
t+1
(
1− T st+1
)1−δ
− βtλt = 0
∂L
∂µt
= βt [(1 + rt) at + wthtT
s
t − ct − at+1] = 0
∂L
∂λt
= βt
[
Eth
δ
t (1− T
s
t )
1−δ − ht+1
]
= 0
from which, rearranging and substituting, we get the following relevant equations:
1
ct
=
β
ct+1
(1 + rt+1) (9)
7plus the standard the transversality conditions.
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wtht
ct (1− δ)Ethδt (1− T
s
t )
−δ
=
βδwt+1
(
1− T st+1
)
ct+1 (1− δ)
+
βwt+1T
s
t+1
ct+1
(10)
at+1 = (1 + rt) at + wthtT
s
t − ct (11)
ht+1 = Eth
δ
t (1− T
s
t )
1−δ (12)
Equation (9) is the typical Euler equation for optimal consumption over time.
Equation (10) is the optimality condition for human capital accumulation after sub-
stitution of the Lagrange multipliers λt and µt using the first-order conditions with
respect to consumption and production time supply notably. The left-hand side mea-
sures the marginal cost of human capital accumulation, which is simply reflected in
the wage forgone in period t due to education. The right-hand side is the sum of
two marginal benefit terms: the increase in the marginal productivity of education
time in t+ 1 and the increasing labor remuneration in the same period. Equations
(11) and (12) are just the law of evolution of consumer’s wealth and the education
technology respectively.
3.3 Market equilibrium conditions
Together with the solution of the problem of the firm and of the household, the
stationary equilibrium of the decentralized economy is characterized also by the
market equilibrium condition:
yt = ct +
n
ξ
t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
from which:
At [(1− ρt)htT
s
t Lt]
1−α
nαt = ct +
n
ξ
t (1− ρt)
θ
ρ
η
t
dt
(13)
and by the labor market equilibrium condition:
T dt = T
s
t = Tt (14)
We are now able to set the following definition of equilibrium for the economy
under investigation:
Definition Given the initial condition h0, an equilibrium is a path:
{rt, Tt, ht, ρt, nt, wt, ct, at}t≥0
that satisfies the equations (4)-(6) and (9)-(13) derived above and the corresponding
standard transversality conditions.
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4 Steady-state and comparative statics of the model
Given the decentralized economy considered in the previous Section, it is now possi-
ble to obtain the steady-state values of the different variables (for the computations
see Appendix 7.2), that are given by:
r =
1− β
β
(15)
T =
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
(16)
h = E
1
1−δ
β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
(17)
ρ =
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
(18)
n =
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
· (19)
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ
w = (1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·(20)
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
c =
ξ − α
ξ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
· (21)
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
a =
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·(22)
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
The following result can then be stated:
Proposition 2 Provided the following restrictions on the parameters hold:
δ <
1 + β
2β
and
ξ
ξ + θ
< α < ξ
there exists a unique steady state of the model with 0 < T < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1 where
the values of the different variables are given by the expressions (15)-(22).
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Proof. The steady-state values of the variables are obtained in Appendix 7.2.
Concerning the restrictions on the parameters, given the expression obtained for T :
T =
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
the fact that 0 < T < 1 implies 0 < 1−βδ
1+β−2βδ
< 1, and since the numerator is positive
(because 0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ < 1) we must have (for the first inequality to hold):
1 + β − 2βδ > 0⇒ δ <
1 + β
2β
while the second inequality is always verified (being δ < 1). Given the expression
obtained for ρ:
ρ =
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
then, the fact that 0 < ρ < 1 implies 0 < αη
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
< 1, from which:
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ > 0⇒ α >
ξ
ξ + η + θ
and also:
αη < α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ ⇒ α >
ξ
ξ + θ
Since we also have α < ξ (because the latter must be larger than 1 for the cost
function to be convex), this implies the following restrictions:
ξ
ξ + θ
< α < ξ
The steady-state values obtained above can then be used for the comparative
statics analysis of the decentralized equilibrium. The results (see computations in
Appendix 7.3) can be summarized in the following Table (for the missing elements, it
is not possible to derive analytically the sign of the relationship between the variable
and the parameter that affects it, and it is necessary to resort to simulations to have
this indication):
Table 4: Comparative statics of the model
r T h ρ n w c a
α 0 0 0 −
β − − + 0
δ 0 + + 0
ξ 0 0 0 +
θ 0 0 0 −
η 0 0 0 +
A 0 0 0 0 + + + +
E 0 0 + 0 + − + +
L 0 0 0 0 + − + −
d 0 0 0 0 + + + +
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These results can be interpreted as follows.
The interest rate r depends negatively on the discount factor (β), and the same factor
(that represents also the degree of impatience) has a negative impact on the time
spent working T and a positive impact on human capital h. A higher productivity
of human capital (through the elasticity parameter δ) has a positive influence on the
time spent working T and (either through the efficiency parameter E or through the
elasticity parameter δ - in this latter case if E is high enough -) on human capital h.
In other words, when households are less impatient or when human capital is more
productive, the level of human capital improves.
The fraction of the workforce in the human resources service ρ depends positively on
the weight (elasticity) of tasks in horizontal coordination costs (ξ) and on the weight
of human resources in vertical coordination costs (η) and it depends negatively on
the weight of production workers in horizontal coordination costs (θ) and on the
weight of tasks in total output (α). In other words, more workers are allocated to
human resources management when coordination costs are more resources intensive
or consuming, or when the production failure risk (due to switch costs between tasks)
is higher. On the contrary, more workers are allocated to production activities when
task specialization is more productive or when bureaucratic coordination is more
costly.
The intensity of multi-tasking n (the number of tasks per individual) as well as the
level of consumption c increase with the efficiency of human capital E, the size of the
workforce L and the technological efficiency of production A; and they decrease with
the extent of coordination costs (recall that a higher d means a lower importance of
coordination costs).
The wage rate w decreases with the efficiency of human capital E, the size of the
workforce L and the extent of coordination costs, and increases with the technolog-
ical efficiency of production A.
The level of assets a decreases with the size of the workforce L and the extent of
coordination costs and increases with the efficiency of human capital E and the
technological efficiency of production A.
5 Short-term dynamics of the model
The model considered can then be simulated in order to study the effects of different
types of technological shocks that can hit the economy. Hereafter we present some
representative simulation experiments on a calibrated model. Since the model is in
many aspects highly stylized (no physical capital for example), calibrating it on a
real economy is a daunting task. Below we consider a benchmark calibration and
the corresponding short-term dynamics. The equilibrium paths generated by this
calibration have been checked to be qualitatively robust to numerous parameters’
changes. While the quantitative results displayed below are only indicative and
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should not be taken too seriously, the qualitative dynamics are found to be strongly
robust.
5.1 Calibration
As usual, the simulation of the model requires a calibration, and the values chosen
for the different parameters are reported in the following table:
Table 5: Calibration of the model, benchmark case
Parameter Symbol V alue
Parameter α in the production function α 0.65
Psychological discount factor β 0.99
Productivity of human capital δ 0.9
Parameter ξ in the coordination costs function ξ 1.2
Parameter θ in the coordination costs function θ 0.7
Parameter η in the coordination costs function η 0.01
Productivity of output A 1
Efficiency of human capital E 2
Size of the workforce L 1
Parameter d in the coordination costs function d 0.5
In particular, on the one hand these parameters are such that they satisfy the
restrictions obtained above (in order to have convexity of the cost function and exis-
tence of the steady-state). On the other hand, the same parameters allow to obtain
steady-state values of some relevant quantities that are reasonable on the basis on
the empirical evidence that is available. For instance, with this parameterization in
the steady state the fraction of time devoted to production is slightly more than 0.5,
the ratio consumption/output is close to 0.95 and the fraction of the workforce in
the human resources services is larger than 0.10.
5.2 Simulation
Starting from the values chosen, different types of shocks are considered, and the
consequences on the economy are analyzed. In particular, it is possible to consider
a shock on the productivity of output A, a shock on the efficiency of human capital
E and a shock on the coordination costs through the parameter d. All these shocks
are permanent.
The first situation considered is an increase in A (the productivity of output).
From the analytical results derived previously we know that this increase has a long
run effect on the number of tasks performed per worker and on output (that both
increase). The simulation allows studying the behaviour of all quantities also in the
short run (Figures 1.1− 1.4).
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In particular, the simulations show that the number of tasks per worker n in-
creases also in the short run, immediately after the increase in A, and remains at this
level in the long run. The output level behaves in the same way, since it increases
immediately after the increase in A, and then remains at this value in the long
run. Also the fraction of the workforce in the human resources service ρ increases
immediately after the increase in A, but then it returns to its initial level, since the
long run value of this variable is not affected by A. The same holds for the level of
human capital, that is characterized by an increase (of small amount) followed by
a decrease, and for the allocation of time between production and human capital
accumulation (with an initial increase of the time devoted to productive activity
immediately after the shock on A, that in the end returns to its initial level).
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If we consider an increase in the parameter d that characterizes the extent of
coordination costs (a rise in d reduces the importance of coordination costs), we get
the same results as for the increase in A.
More precisely, the increase in d increases the intensity of multi-tasking and
the output level immediately after the shock, and this effect persists also in the
long run. The fraction of the workforce in the human resources service, the level
of human capital and the allocation of time in favour of production, on the other
hand, increase immediately after the shock on d, but then return to their initial
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levels since this shock does not affect their long run values. Intuitively, an increase
in d corresponds to a reduction in coordination costs and represents therefore the
same kind of qualitative productivity shock as a rise in the technological parameter
A.
The last situation analyzed is an increase in the efficiency of human capital E.
In this case, we have shown analytically that a rise in E has a long run effect on
the number of tasks performed per worker, on the level of output and on the level
of human capital (that all increase).
In the short run (Figures 2.1 − 2.4), the timing of the effects of the shock on
the different variables is different from the previous cases. In effect, the number of
tasks per worker n gradually increases after the rise in E and reaches, in the long
run, a level higher than the initial one (while in the other cases examined there is
immediately the jump in the variable, that then remains at the new value). Following
the rise in E, output also increases gradually reaching the new long run level, and
the same happens for the level of human capital. On the contrary, the fraction of
the workforce in the human resources service and the allocation of time in favour
of productive activity initially increase but then return to their initial levels, since
their long run values are not affected by the shock on E.
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It is important to observe that the results of these simulations (in particular, as
outlined above, from the qualitative point of view) are consistent with the available
data, concerning for instance the intensity of multi-tasking and other flexible organi-
zational forms, and the behaviour of the workforce employed in the human resources
service (see Tables 2 and 3) following the ICT Revolution of the 90s. This fraction
of the workforce has increased in major economies. This is the kind of behaviour
that also emerges from the simulation exercises of the present model, which there-
fore behaves extremely well in replicating the organizational features of the ICT
revolution. Interestingly enough, our model predicts a transitory increase in the
size of the human resources department in response to all the performed permanent
technological shocks, which certainly needs to be corroborated on updated data.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model to analyze the intensity of multi-tasking under various
exogenous technological accelerations. The model has two original characteristics:
it includes endogenous coordination costs, and it introduces the size of the human
resources department as a key variable for the firms to control their coordination
costs. In our modelling, and building on recent economic and management litera-
ture, we distinguish between vertical and horizontal coordination costs, which proves
crucial in the equilibrium properties of the model. The model also includes endoge-
nous human capital accumulation, and therefore brings together enough ingredients
to study some highly relevant stylized facts identified in the introduction section
in OECD data. Although technological progress is exogenous in our set-up, and
no technology adoption decision is to be taken, we believe that the model offers a
useful shortcut to analyze the consequences of technological accelerations on work-
place organization. The fact that all performed numerical simulations corroborate
the ability of the model to replicate the observed stylized facts is a good indication
of that.
Two extensions are currently in our agenda. One concerns the incorporation
of an explicit technology adoption decision where the firms have to decide whether
they should buy a more efficient technology also involving costly organizational re-
structuring. This sensitive issue is left in the dark in our framework. A second issue
concerns a component of coordination costs not treated in this paper, but already
explicitly mentioned in the introduction, that’s the negative impact of flexible or-
ganizational forms (like multi-tasking) on the health of workers by inducing more
stress, pressure and so on, as documented for example by Askenazy et al. (2002). We
are currently studying the normative implications of such a situation (Boucekkine
et al., 2008).
21
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., P. Antras and E. Helpman (2005), “Contracts and the Division
of Labor”, NBER Working Paper 11356.
[2] Aoki, M. (1986), “Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm”,
American Economic Review 76 (5), 971-983.
[3] Askenazy, P. (2001), “Innovative Workplace Practices and Occupational In-
juries and Illnesses in the United States”, Economic and Industrial Democracy
22 (4), 485-516.
[4] Askenazy, P. and E. Caroli (2006), “Innovative Work Practices, Information
Technologies and Working Conditions: Evidence for France”, IZA Working
Paper 2321.
[5] Askenazy, P., E. Caroli and V. Marcus (2002), “New Organizational Practices
and Working Conditions: Evidence from France in the 1990’s”, Recherches
Economiques de Louvain 68 (1-2), 91-110.
[6] Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1996), Economic Growth, Mc Graw Hill.
[7] Becker, G. S. and K. M. Murphy (1992), “The Division of Labor, Coordination
Costs, and Knowledge”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (4), 1137-
1160.
[8] Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (1994), “The Firm as a Communication Net-
work”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4), 809-839.
[9] Borghans, L. and B. ter Weel (2006), “The Division of Labour, Worker Organ-
isation and Technological Change”, Economic Journal 116 (509), F45-F72.
[10] Boucekkine, R. and P. Crifo (2007), “Human Capital Accumulation and the
Transition from Specialization to Multi-tasking”, Macroeconomic Dynamics
forthcoming.
[11] Boucekkine, R., P. Crifo and C. Mattalia (2008), “Is there too much multi-
tasking following the ICT revolution? ”, working paper in progress.
[12] Brenner, M., D. Fairris and J. Ruser (2004), “Flexible Work Practices and Oc-
cupational Safety and Health: Exploring the Relationship between Cumulative
Trauma Disorders and Workplace Transformation”, Industrial Relations 43 (1),
242-266.
[13] Bresnahan, T., E. Brynjolfsson and L. Hitt (2002), “Information Technology,
Workplace Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evi-
dence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 339-376.
22
[14] Brynjolfsson, E., T. Malone, V. Gurbaxani and A. Kambil (1994), “Does In-
formation Technology Lead to Smaller Firms?”, Management Science 40 (12),
1628-1644.
[15] Cartwright, S. and C. Cooper (1997), Managing Workplace Stress. London:
Sage Publications, Inc.
[16] Crowston, K. (1997), “A Coordination Theory Approach to Organizational
Process Design”, Organization Science 8 (2), 157-175.
[17] Dessein, W. and T. Santos (2003), “The Demand for Coordination”, NBER
Working Paper N. W10056.
[18] Fairris, D. and M. Brenner (2001), “Workplace Transformation and the Rise in
Cumulative Trauma Disorder”, Journal of Labor Research 22 (1), 15-28.
[19] Faraj, S. and L. Sproull (2000), “Coordinating Expertise in Software Develop-
ment Teams”, Management Science 46 (12), 1554-1568.
[20] Garicano, L. (2000), “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Pro-
duction”, Journal of Political Economy 108 (5), 874-904.
[21] Gordon, F. and D. Risley (1999), The Costs to Britain of Workplace Accidents
and Work-Related Ill Health in 1995/6. Second Edition, HSE. London: HSE
Books.
[22] Gordon, D. (1994), “Bosses of different stripes: a cross- national perspective
on monitoring and supervision”, American Economic Review 84 (2), 375-379.
[23] Hobijn, B. (1999),“The Division of Labor in an Increasing Complex World”,
New York University Working Paper.
[24] Hoel, H., K. Sparks and C. Cooper (2001), “The Cost of Violence/Stress at
Work and the Benefits of a Violence/Stress-Free Working Environment”, Re-
port commissioned by the International Labour Organisation, conducted by the
University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology.
[25] Joskow, P. (2003), Vertical Integration. Handbook of New Institutional Eco-
nomics, Kluwer.
[26] Lien, M-C., E. Ruthruff and D. Kuhns (2006), “On the Difficulty in Task
Switching: Assessing the Role of Task-Set Inhibition”, Psychonomic Bulletin
and Review, 13 (3), 530-535.
[27] Lien, M-C., R. Schweickert and R. Proctor (2003), “Task Switching and Re-
sponse Correspondence in the Psychological Refractory Period Paradigm”,
Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (3), 692-712.
[28] Osterman, P. (2004), “How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who
Adopts It?”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 47, 173-189.
23
[29] Radner, R. (1993), “The Organisation of Decentralized Information Process-
ing”, Econometrica 61 (5), 1109-1146.
[30] Ramaciotti, D. and J. Perriard (1999), “Certification Qualité Selon ISO 9000
et Fréquence des Accidents du Travail dans un Groupe d’Entreprises Suisses”,
Actes du XXXIVème Congrès de la SELF-CAEN, 653-660.
[31] SHL (2004), “Getting the Edge in the New People Economy”, Report commis-
sioned by the Future Foundation, conducted by the SHL Group.
[32] Tamura, R. (1992), “Efficient Equilibrium Convergence: Heterogeneity and
Growth”, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 355-376.
[33] Wallis, J. and D. North (1986), “Measuring the Transactions Sector in the
American Economy, 1870-1970”, in Long Term Factors in American Economic
Growth, S. Engerman and R. Gallman eds., University of Chicago Press.
[34] Wang, N. (2003), “Measuring Transaction Costs: an Incomplete Survey”,
Ronald Coase Institute Working Paper 2.
[35] Yang, X. and J. Borland (1991), “A Microeconomic Mechanism for Economic
Growth”, Journal of Political Economy 99, 460-482.
24
7 Appendix
7.1 Second-order conditions at the steady-state in the de-
centralized economy
To check, at the steady state, the second-order conditions of the problem of the firm
that guarantee the presence of a maximum it is possible to observe that we have (at
the steady-state):
∂2f
∂n2
= α (α− 1)A
[
(1− ρ)hT dL
]1−α
nα−2 −
ξ (ξ − 1) (1− ρ)θ ρη
d
nξ−2
∂2f
∂ (T d)2
= −α (1− α)A
[
(1− ρ) hT dL
]−α−1
(1− ρ)2 h2L2nα
∂2f
∂ρ2
= −α (1− α)A
[
(1− ρ) hT dL
]−α−1
h2
(
T d
)2
L2nα +
−
nξ
d
[
η
[
(η − 1) (1− ρ)θ ρη−2 − θ (1− ρ)θ−1 ρη−1
]
+
−θ
[
η (1− ρ)θ−1 ρη−1 − (θ − 1) (1− ρ)θ−2 ρη
]]
∂2f
∂T d∂n
=
∂2f
∂n∂T d
= α (1− α)A
[
(1− ρ) hT dL
]−α
(1− ρ)hLnα−1
∂2f
∂ρ∂n
=
∂2f
∂n∂ρ
= −α (1− α)A
[
(1− ρ)hT dL
]−α
hT dLnα−1 +
−
ξnξ−1
d
[
η (1− ρ)θ ρη−1 − θ (1− ρ)θ−1 ρη
]
∂2f
∂ρ∂T d
=
∂2f
∂T d∂ρ
= − (1− α)2A [(1− ρ) hL]−α h
(
T d
)−α
Lnα
The hessian matrix is then:
H =

∂2f
∂n2
∂2f
∂Td∂n
∂2f
∂ρ∂n
∂2f
∂n∂Td
∂2f
∂(Td)
2
∂2f
∂ρ∂Td
∂2f
∂n∂ρ
∂2f
∂Td∂ρ
∂2f
∂ρ2

and in order to have a maximum for the problem of the firm the sequence of the
signs of the north-west principal minors of this matrix must be:
H1 < 0 H2 > 0 H3 < 0
With reference to this aspect we have:
H1 < 0⇒
∂2f
∂n2
< 0⇒ α (α− 1)A
[
(1− ρ) hT dL
]1−α
nα−2−
ξ (ξ − 1) (1− ρ)θ ρη
d
nξ−2 < 0
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that is always true (since it must be ξ > 1). We then have:
H2 > 0⇒
∂2f
∂n2
·
∂2f
∂ (T d)2
−
(
∂2f
∂T d∂n
)2
> 0
that implies:[
α (α− 1)A (1− ρ)1−α (hL)1−α
(
T d
)1−α
nα−2 −
ξ (ξ − 1) (1− ρ)θ ρη
d
nξ−2
]
·
·
[
−α (1− α)A (1− ρ)1−α (hL)1−α
(
T d
)−α−1
nα
]
+
−
[
α (1− α)A (1− ρ)1−α (hL)1−α
(
T d
)−α
nα−1
]2
> 0
that leads to:
α
d
(1− α) ξ (ξ − 1)A (1− ρ)1−α+θ ρη (hL)1−α
(
T d
)−α−1
nα+ξ−2 > 0
that is always true (since ξ > 1). We finally have:
H3 < 0⇒ detH < 0
that can be checked during the simulations (because it is not possible to obtain an
analytic solution for this inequality). In this case the second-order conditions of the
problem of the firm are satisfied and the value found is effectively a maximum.
7.2 Steady-state in the decentralized economy
The steady-state of the decentralized economy is obtained considering all the quan-
tities constant in the first-order conditions of the problem of the firm and of the
household and in the market equilibrium conditions, that is:
αA
(
hT dL
)1−α
(1− ρ)1−α nα =
ξ
d
nξ (1− ρ)θ ρη (23)
(1− α)A
(
hT dL
)−α
(1− ρ)1−α nα = w (24)
(1− α)A
(
hT dL
)1−α
(1− ρ)1−α nα =
nξ
d
(1− ρ)θ ρη
[
θ −
η (1− ρ)
ρ
]
(25)
1
c
=
β
c
(1 + r) (26)
h
(1− δ)Ehδ (1− T s)−δ
=
βδ (1− T s)
1− δ
+ βT s (27)
c = whT s + ra (28)
h = Ehδ (1− T s)1−δ (29)
26
A (hT sL)1−α (1− ρ)1−α nα = c+
nξ (1− ρ)θ ρη
d
(30)
T d = T s = T (31)
From these equations it is possible to get the steady-state values of the different
variables. In particular, from (26) we have:
β (1 + r) = 1⇒ 1 + r =
1
β
⇒ r =
1− β
β
Using from now on (31), so that we only write T , from (27) and (29) we obtain:
Ehδ (1− T )1−δ
(1− δ)Ehδ (1− T )−δ
=
βδ (1− T )
1− δ
+ βT ⇒
1− T
1− δ
=
βδ (1− T )
1− δ
+ βT
⇒ 1− T = βδ (1− T ) + βT (1− δ)
⇒ 1− βδ = T (1 + β − 2βδ)
⇒ T =
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
From (29) (using the expression just found for T ) we then get:
h = Ehδ
(
1−
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
)1−δ
⇒ h1−δ = E
(
β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
)1−δ
⇒ h = E
1
1−δ
β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
From (23) and (25) we then have:
1− α
α
=
1
ξ
[
θ −
η (1− ρ)
ρ
]
⇒
1− α
α
ξ =
θρ− η + ηρ
ρ
⇒
1− α
α
ξρ = (η + θ) ρ− η
⇒
(
η + θ −
1− α
α
ξ
)
ρ = η ⇒
αη + αθ − ξ + αξ
α
ρ = η
⇒ ρ =
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
From (23) (using the expressions found above for the different variables) we obtain:
αAd (hTL)1−α (1− ρ)1−α = ξnξ−α (1− ρ)θ ρη
⇒ nξ−α =
αAd (hTL)1−α (1− ρ)1−α
ξ (1− ρ)θ ρη
⇒ n =
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
(hTL)
1−α
ξ−α (1− ρ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α ρ
η
α−ξ
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⇒ n =
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
(
E
1
1−δ ·
β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
·
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
· L
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
·
(
1−
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
) 1−α−θ
ξ−α
(
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
) η
α−ξ
⇒ n =
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ
From (24) we then have:
w = (1− α)A (hTL)−α (1− ρ)1−α nα
⇒ w = (1− α)A
(
E
1
1−δ ·
β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
·
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
· L
)−α(
1−
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
)1−α
·
·
(
αAd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
E
α(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(1−α−θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(1−α−θ−η)
α−ξ
⇒ w = (1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
From (30) we have:
c = A (hTL)1−α (1− ρ)1−α nα −
nξ (1− ρ)θ ρη
d
⇒ c = A
(
E
1
1−δ ·
β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
·
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
· L
)1−α(
1−
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
)1−α
·
·
(
αAd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
E
α(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(1−α−θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(1−α−θ−η)
α−ξ +
−
1
d
(
αAd
ξ
) ξ
ξ−α
E
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ(1−α−θ)
ξ−α (αη)
ξη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
ξ(1−α−θ−η)
α−ξ ·
·
(
1−
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
)θ (
αη
α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ
)η
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⇒ c =
ξ − α
ξ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
Finally from (28) we obtain:
a =
1
r
(c− whT )
⇒ a =
β
1− β
[
ξ − α
ξ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α +
− (1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α ·
·E
1
1−δ
· β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
·
1− βδ
1 + β − 2βδ
]
⇒ a =
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
7.3 Comparative statics in the decentralized economy
The comparative statics of the model in the decentralized economy can be obtained
from equations (15)-(22). In particular, from (15) we have:
dr
dβ
=
−β − 1 + β
β2
= −
1
β2
From (16) we then have:
∂T
∂β
=
−δ (1 + β − 2βδ)− (1− βδ) (1− 2δ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
=
−δ − βδ + 2βδ2 − 1 + 2δ + βδ − 2βδ2
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
=
=
δ − 1
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
and also:
∂T
∂δ
=
−β (1 + β − 2βδ) + 2β (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
=
−β − β2 + 2β2δ + 2β − 2β2δ
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
=
=
β − β2
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
=
β (1− β)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
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From (17) we get:
∂h
∂E
=
1
1− δ
E
1
1−δ
−1 β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
= E
δ
1−δ
β
1 + β − 2βδ
and also:
∂h
∂β
= E
1
1−δ
(1− δ) (1 + β − 2βδ)− β (1− δ) (1− 2δ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
=
= E
1
1−δ
1 + β − 2βδ − δ − βδ + 2βδ2 − β + 2βδ + βδ − 2βδ2
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
=
= E
1
1−δ
1− δ
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
and then:
∂h
∂δ
= E
1
1−δ
−β (1 + β − 2βδ) + 2β2 (1− δ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
+
β (1− δ)
1 + β − 2βδ
E
1
1−δ
1
(1− δ)2
logE =
= E
1
1−δ
−β − β2 + 2β2δ + 2β2 − 2β2δ
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
+ E
1
1−δ
β
(1− δ) (1 + β − 2βδ)
logE =
= E
1
1−δ
β2 − β
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
+ E
1
1−δ
β
(1− δ) (1 + β − 2βδ)
logE =
=
E
1
1−δ
1 + β − 2βδ
[
β (β − 1)
1 + β − 2βδ
+
β
1− δ
logE
]
From (18) we have:
∂ρ
∂α
=
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ) η − αη (ξ + η + θ)
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
=
=
αξη + αη2 + αθη − ξη − αξη − αη2 − αθη
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
= −
ξη
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
and then:
∂ρ
∂θ
=
−αη · α
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
= −
α2η
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
and also:
∂ρ
∂ξ
=
−αη (α− 1)
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
=
αη (1− α)
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
and finally:
∂ρ
∂η
=
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)α− αη · α
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
=
=
α2ξ + α2η + α2θ − αξ − α2η
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
=
α [α (ξ + θ)− ξ]
(α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)2
30
From (19) we then have:
∂n
∂E
=
1− α
(1− δ) (ξ − α)
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)
−1
L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ =
=
1− α
(1− δ) (ξ − α)
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
E
1−ξ(1−δ)−αδ
(1−δ)(ξ−α) L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ
and then:
∂n
∂L
=
1− α
ξ − α
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−α
ξ−α
−1
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ =
=
1− α
ξ − α
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−ξ
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ
and also:
∂n
∂A
=
1
ξ − α
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
−1
αd
ξ
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ =
=
1
ξ − α
(
αAd
ξ
) 1−ξ+α
ξ−α αd
ξ
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ
and finally:
∂n
∂d
=
1
ξ − α
(
αAd
ξ
) 1
ξ−α
−1
αA
ξ
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ =
=
1
ξ − α
(
αAd
ξ
) 1−ξ+α
ξ−α αA
ξ
E
1−α
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
1−α
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) 1−α
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ
ξ−α (αη)
η
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
1−α−θ−η
α−ξ
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From (20) we get:
∂w
∂E
=
α (1− ξ)
(1− δ) (ξ − α)
(1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)
−1
L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
α (1− ξ)
(1− δ) (ξ − α)
(1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(2−ξ−δ)−ξ(1−δ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α) L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and then:
∂w
∂L
=
α (1− ξ)
ξ − α
(1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
−1
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
α (1− ξ)
ξ − α
(1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(2−ξ)−ξ
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and also:
∂w
∂A
=
ξ
ξ − α
(1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−α
−1E
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
ξ
ξ − α
(1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
α
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and finally:
∂w
∂d
=
α
ξ − α
(1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
−1
α
ξ
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
1− α
ξ (ξ − α)
α
ξ
ξ−α
(
d
ξ
) 2α−ξ
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
)α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
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From (21) we have:
∂c
∂E
=
ξ (1− α)
(1− δ) (ξ − α)
·
ξ − α
ξ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)
−1
L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
1− α
1− δ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)+δ(ξ−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α) L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and then:
∂c
∂L
=
ξ (1− α)
ξ − α
·
ξ − α
ξ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
−1
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
= (1− α)
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and also:
∂c
∂A
=
ξ
ξ − α
·
ξ − α
ξ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−α
−1E
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
α
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and finally:
∂c
∂d
=
α
ξ − α
·
ξ − α
ξ
(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
−1
α
ξ
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
α2
ξ2
(
αd
ξ
) 2α−ξ
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
·
· (α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+θ)−ξ
α−ξ (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
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Finally, from (22) we get:
∂a
∂E
=
ξ (1− α)
(1− δ) (ξ − α)
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)
−1
L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
ξ (1− α)
(1− δ) (ξ − α)
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
α(1−ξ)+δ(ξ−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α) L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and then:
∂a
∂L
=
α (1− ξ)
ξ − α
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α
−1 ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
α (1− ξ)
ξ − α
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
2α−ξ(1+α)
ξ−α ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
and also:
∂a
∂A
=
ξ
ξ − α
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−α
−1E
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
ξ
ξ − α
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
A
α
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
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and finally:
∂a
∂d
=
α
ξ − α
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) α
ξ−α
−1
α
ξ
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α =
=
α2
ξ (ξ − α)
·
β
1− β
(
ξ − α
ξ
L− 1 + α
)(
αd
ξ
) 2α−ξ
ξ−α
A
ξ
ξ−αE
ξ(1−α)
(1−δ)(ξ−α)L
α(1−ξ)
ξ−α ·
·
(
β (1− δ) (1− βδ)
(1 + β − 2βδ)2
) ξ(1−α)
ξ−α
(α (ξ + θ)− ξ)
ξ−α(ξ+θ)
ξ−α (αη)
αη
α−ξ (α (ξ + η + θ)− ξ)
α(ξ+η+θ)−ξ
ξ−α
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